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WORDS AS WEAPONS: ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS THAT 
RESULT IN SUICIDE AND THE UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH WITH 
CRIMINAL CULPABILITY BASED ON WORDS ALONE 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, teenagers Michelle Carter and Conrad Roy III formed a romantic 
relationship, which primarily consisted of online and cell phone 
communication.1 The relationship was discrete, for even Conrad’s best friend 
was unaware of its existence.2 In July of 2014, Conrad’s body was found by 
police inside the cabin of his pickup truck.3 Conrad had parked at a K-Mart in 
Fairhaven, Massachusetts and used a combustion engine to poison himself with 
carbon monoxide.4 Conrad and Carter lived approximately fifty miles apart 
and had not seen each other for approximately a year prior to Conrad’s death.5 
Even so, on August 21, 2015, a grand jury issued an indictment charging 
Carter with involuntary manslaughter for assisting in Conrad’s suicide.6 Carter 
is being tried in juvenile court since she was seventeen at the time of Conrad’s 
death, but could still serve up to twenty years in state prison.7 The 
 
 1. Commonwealth’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 1, Commonwealth v. Carter, No. 
15YO0001NE (Mass. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21, 2015) [hereinafter “Resp. to Def.’s Mot.”]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 17. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Denise Lavoie, Texts Led to Suicide, Prosecutor Says, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 
9, 2015, 1:43 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2015/09/09/teen-charged-with-en 
couraging-her-boyfriend-to-kill-himself. 
 6. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 1. 
 7. Michael E. Miller, ‘Manslaughter by text’: teen faces charges after boyfriend kills 
himself, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 26, 2015), http://www.smh.com.au/world/ 
manslaughter-by-text-teen-faces-charges-after-boyfriend-suicides-20150925-gjv9xk.html. The 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts is permitted to seek an indictment against a juvenile who 
committed a specific type of violent crime if they were seventeen at the time of the offense. 
Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 1 N.E.3d 237, 242 (Mass. 2013). Once an indictment is 
successfully obtained, the juvenile is classified as a youthful offender who is proceeded against in 
juvenile court even though they may be treated as an adult in other respects. Id. For example, 
their court proceedings are not shielded from the public, they may receive an adult sentence, and 
they may serve their prison sentence in an adult correctional facility or state prison. Id. The 
juvenile court also retains jurisdiction over children who turn eighteen while their cases are 
pending. Id. at 241. The manslaughter penalty under MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13 
(LexisNexis 2016) states that a defendant convicted of manslaughter may not be sentenced to 
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prosecution’s argument that Carter assisted in the suicide of Conrad and that 
her actions constituted involuntary manslaughter rests on three theories: Carter 
counseled him to overcome his doubts8 for more than a week prior to his 
suicide via hundreds of text messages,9 Carter researched and devised the plan 
to run the combustion engine within his truck, and Carter directed him to go 
back into his truck after he exited because he was frightened that the plan was 
working.10 Furthermore, Carter lied to the police and Conrad’s family 
regarding his whereabouts, both while he was committing the act itself and 
afterwards, implying that she had no knowledge of the incident.11 
Carter had asked Conrad to delete their exchange of text messages before 
he followed through with the suicide, however, authorities still recovered 
them.12 The morning Conrad killed himself, Carter had texted him, “You can’t 
think about it. You just have to do it. You said you were gonna do it. Like I 
don’t get why you aren’t.”13 “You can’t keep living this way. You just need to 
do it like you did the last time and not think about it.”14 Carter was aware that 
Conrad attempted suicide two years earlier, received counseling, and had a 
history of anxiety and depression.15 After the incident, Carter felt guilt and 
remorse and wrote to one of her friends, “[If] they read my messages with him 
I’m done. His family will hate me and I can go to jail.”16 “[H]is death is my 
fault. Like, honestly, I could have stopped it. I was the one on the phone with 
him and he got out of the car because [it] was working and he got scared and I 
told him to get back in.”17 “I’m the reason everyone was in that church 
yesterday.”18 “I helped ease him into it and told him I was okay . . . I could 
have easily stopped him or called the police but I didn’t.”19 In total, Carter and 
 
more than twenty years in prison. Commonwealth v. Brown, 1 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Mass. 2013). 
Judges thereby have discretion in deciding defendants’ terms. Id. 
 8. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 1. 
 9. Abby Phillip, ‘It’s now or never’: Texts reveal teen’s efforts to pressure her boyfriend 
into suicide, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix 
/wp/2015/08/31/its-now-or-never-texts-reveal-teens-efforts-to-pressure-boyfriend-into-suicide/. 
 10. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 6–7. 
 11. Phillip, supra note 9. 
 12. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 40. 
 13. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 1. 
 14. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 1. 
 15. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 6; see also Lavoie, supra note 5. After his prior 
suicide attempt, Conrad spent time in a psychiatric hospital according to his Aunt. Id. However, 
she stated that Conrad “did not have the signs.” Id. Conrad’s grandfather further explained that 
Conrad seemed happy in the days before his suicide. Id. He blamed Carter: “We saw the light at 
the end of the tunnel, and [Carter] just blew that tunnel up. She shut the light off.” Id. 
 16. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 20. 
 17. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 21. 
 18. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 20. 
 19. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 21–22. 
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Conrad shared over one-thousand text messages in the weeks leading up to his 
suicide.20 On the evening that Conrad took his life, Carter’s final text message 
to Conrad read, “You can do this.”21 Three minutes later Conrad called Carter, 
and they spoke on the phone for ninety minutes until Conrad successfully 
poisoned himself.22 Prosecutors allege that Carter’s motive was to receive as 
much attention and sympathy as possible from her family and friends after 
Conrad’s death.23 
According to Carter’s defense attorney, Joseph Cataldo, this case is 
unprecedented in the state of Massachusetts, and he is unaware of any cases in 
the state “where a person who is thirty miles away is charged with committing 
manslaughter by text.”24 Former Massachusetts prosecutor, Rikki Klieman, 
acknowledges that while the accusations facing Carter are “horrendous,” the 
facts do not fit neatly into any existing statute in Massachusetts.25 “It’s not 
cyberbullying, it’s not harassment, it’s not stalking. So the prosecutor says, 
‘This is reprehensible conduct, disgusting conduct, must-be punished conduct,’ 
so he goes forward and says, ‘Let’s call this involuntary manslaughter.’ Does it 
neatly fit in that definition? Not so much.”26 
When severe incidents like Conrad’s result in suicide and receive national 
attention, prosecutors are forced to “shoe-horn” these incidents into ill-fitting 
statutes in an aggressive attempt to criminally punish the perpetrators.27 This 
comment will address three different charges that prosecutors may utilize in 
these types of scenarios: cyberbullying, assisted suicide, and involuntary 
manslaughter. This is an analysis of each charge through the lens of Conrad’s 
case and will address the hurdles the prosecution must overcome in order to 
convict Carter under each offense. Part I of this comment will compare current 
state cyberbullying laws and critique the major gaps and First Amendment 
breaches in the promulgation of these statutes. This part will focus on severe 
cyberbullying incidents that result in suicide and will propose an effective 
criminal procedure to combat cyberbullying that does not over-criminalize 
cyberbullies. This part will then assess the likely effect of these proposed 
amendments as applied to Conrad’s case. Part II will compare how the states 
 
 20. Miller, supra note 7. 
 21. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 16. 
 22. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 17. 
 23. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 22. 
 24. Stephanie Slifer, Is it a crime to “encourage suicide”? Teens’ texts under scrutiny, CBS 
NEWS (Mar. 3, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-it-a-crime-to-encourage-sui 
cide-unusual-massachusetts-case-of-conrad-roy-and-michelle-carter/. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Justin W. Patchin, Most Cyberbullying Cases Aren’t Criminal, CYBERBULLYING 
RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 12, 2010), http://cyberbullying.org/most-cyberbullying-cases-arent-
criminal/. 
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address assisted suicide and focus on the recent statutory modifications that 
further require some physical act beyond pure speech in order to reach a 
conviction. This part will then propose that each state adopt more stringent 
statutes, as some states have already begun to, and further analyze Carter’s 
actions in the context of different states’ assisted suicide laws. Part III will lay 
out the prosecution’s prima facie claim under involuntary manslaughter and 
assess how difficult it will be to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Carter’s 
words alone caused Conrad to take his own life. Finally, Part V will propose 
that while Carter’s text messages are reprehensible, this does not mean they are 
criminal. 
I.  CYBERBULLYING 
A. The Growing Technological Era and the Confusion Surrounding 
Cyberbullying 
At first glance, Carter’s text messages appear to be a disturbing case of 
cyberbullying as Carter consistently urged Conrad to kill himself.28 Youth 
suicide continues to be a significant public-health concern in the United States, 
and one major factor that has been linked to suicide is cyberbullying.29 Bullies 
have always existed, but cyberbullying is a unique offense growing more and 
more prevalent as technology advances.30 Due to the convenience and constant 
access provided by cell phones, the average teen spends nine hours a day using 
media, including computers and cell phones.31 Geographical limitations no 
longer restrain a bully’s reach, and victims can now be bullied at any time of 
the day or even in their own homes.32 Electronic communications further 
provide anonymity to the perpetrator and allow for widespread public 
distribution, making them severely dangerous and cruel for adolescents.33 It is 
 
 28. Lavoie, supra note 5. 
 29. Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Research Summary, 
CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR. (2010), http://cyberbullying.org/cyberbullying_and_suicide_ 
research_fact_sheet.pdf. 
 30. Haley E. Phillips, Online Bullying and the First Amendment: State Cyberbullying 
Statutes After People v. Marquan M., 93 N.C.L. REV. 179, 183 (2015). 
 31. Landmark Report: U.S. Teens Use an Average of Nine Hours of Media Per Day, Tweens 
Use Six Hours, COMMON SENSE MEDIA (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.commonsensemedia.org/ 
about-us/news/press-releases/landmark-report-us-teens-use-an-average-of-nine-hours-of-media-
per-day (not including the time spent using media for school or homework). 
 32. Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia, How Not to Criminalize Cyberbullying, 77 MO. 
L. REV. 693 (2012). 
 33. Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act of 2008, 110 H.R. 6123, 106th Cong. § 2(3) 
(2008) [hereinafter “Cyberbullying Prevention Act of 2008”]. Online victimizations are 
associated with emotional distress and other psychological problems, including depression. 
Cyberbullying can negatively impact academic performance, safety, the well-being of children in 
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no surprise public officials have called for the “elimination” of 
cyberbullying,34 however, the vast majority of cyberbullying cases are not 
categorized as criminal nor should they be.35 Tragic incidents such as suicides 
often transform these into high-profile cases that receive national attention and 
unsurmountable public scrutiny.36 
It is important to acknowledge that many teenagers who commit suicide 
subsequent to being cyberbullied have other emotional and social issues 
impacting their lives.37 In fact, studies have shown that approximately ninety-
percent of suicide victims were mentally ill.38 It is unlikely that being a victim 
of cyberbullying by itself will lead to suicide; rather, “it tends to exacerbate 
instability and hopelessness in the minds of adolescents already struggling with 
stressful life circumstances.”39 Carter’s defense attorney contends that 
Conrad’s history of depression and prior suicide attempt where he overdosed 
on acetaminophen40 were the ultimate cause of Conrad’s suicide and that he 
likely had a predisposition to take his own life.41 The defense also asserts that 
Carter repeatedly tried to talk Conrad out of killing himself and only decided to 
support his plan when it became evident she was incapable of changing his 
mind.42 Approximately one month before his suicide, Carter suggested that 
Conrad seek treatment at a psychiatric hospital where she was already 
receiving treatment for her own condition.43 Conrad refused and suggested 
they both kill themselves together “like Romeo and Juliet.”44 Carter’s attorney 
goes so far as to accuse Conrad of “brainwash[ing]” Carter into supporting his 
plan to take his life by “ultimately persuad[ing] a young, impressionable 
 
school, force children to change schools, and in some cases lead to extreme violent behavior, such 
as murder and suicide. 
 34. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 695. The United Nations, for example, has called for 
concerted efforts to eliminate bullying in all regions, which includes cyberbullying. Special 
Representative of Secretary-General on Violence Against Children reasons that “[b]ullying is a 
very serious problem and still a taboo in modern societies.” UN Envoy Calls for Concerted 
Efforts to Eliminate Bullying in All Regions, UN NEWS CENTRE (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.un. 
org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52292#.VsY_hJMrI9c. 
 35. Patchin, supra note 27. 
 36. Patchin, supra note 27. 
 37. Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 29, at 2. 
 38. Risk of Suicide, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/Learn-
More/Mental-Health-Conditions/Related-Conditions/Suicide. 
 39. Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 29, at 2. 
 40. Lavoie, supra note 5. 
 41. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 36. 
 42. Lavoie, supra note 5. 
 43. Lavoie, supra note 5. 
 44. Lavoie, supra note 5. See also infra notes 184–186 (for a more in depth analysis on 
suicide pacts). 
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girl.”45 Conrad and Carter’s dialogue of text messages was not the typical 
exchange of words between a cyberbully and a victim. Among the many texts, 
Carter wrote to Conrad, “You’re finally going to be happy in heaven. No more 
pain. No more bad thoughts and worries. You’ll be free.”46 Carter appeared to 
be in love with Conrad: “I love you to the moon and back . . . . You are my 
beautiful guardian angel forever and ever.”47 
While cyberbullying incidents resulting in suicide are isolated and do not 
represent the norm,48 society agrees that cyberbullying is troublesome.49 
Nonetheless, not everyone agrees on exactly which types of conduct 
cyberbullying should encompass, how far these statutes should reach, or the 
appropriate punishment for violators.50 A universal definition of cyberbullying 
has not yet been defined; however, researchers acknowledge that one is 
overdue.51 The National Conference of State Legislatures has defined 
cyberbullying as the “willful and repeated use of cell phones, computers, and 
other electronic communication devices to harass and threaten others.”52 This 
definition includes four main components: (1) deliberate behavior, not merely 
accidental; (2) repeated behavior, more than a one-time incident; (3) harm 
occurred from the victim’s perspective; and (4) is executed through a 
technological medium.53 Contrarily, the federal government’s interagency 
working group has adopted the broad definition of “any type of harassment or 
bullying (teasing, telling lies, making fun of someone, making rude or mean 
comments, spreading rumors, or making threatening or aggressive comments) 
that occurs through email, a chat room, instant messaging, a website (including 
blogs), or text messaging.”54 Both of these definitions are in stark contrast to 
 
 45. Phillip, supra note 10. 
 46. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 3. 
 47. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 2. See generally Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1 
(detailing all of the text messages that the district attorney released in their full context). 
 48. Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 29, at 1. 
 49. Symposium, Cyberbullying: Emerging Realities and Legal Challenges: Foreword, 77 
MO. L. REV. 613, 614 (2012) [hereinafter “Emerging Realities”]. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Charles E. Notar, Cyberbullying: A Review of the Literature, 1 UNIVERSAL J. OF EDUC. 
RES. 1, 2 (2013), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1053975.pdf. 
 52. Cyberbullying, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/re 
search/education/cyberbullying.aspx. This definition was created by the NCSL. For more 
information on the NCSL, visit http://www.ncsl.org/aboutus.aspx. 
 53. Kelly A. Albin, Bullies in a Wired World: The Impact of Cyberspace Victimization on 
Adolescent Mental Health and the Need for Cyberbullying Legislation in Ohio, 25 J.L. & HEALTH 
155, 157 (2012). 
 54. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 698–99. This definition was issued by a government 
“working group” comprised of representatives from seventeen federal agencies that support 
programs and services focusing on youth. Electronic Aggression, YOUTH.GOV, http://youth.gov/ 
youth-topics/teen-dating-violence/electronic. 
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one another and fall on opposite ends of the spectrum. One encompasses 
seemingly malicious and repeated acts, while the latter could include typical 
juvenile behavior. It is challenging enough to resolve an issue when society 
agrees on its exact definition. Consequently, one of the major challenges in 
prosecuting cyberbullies is the unclear scope of behaviors the laws are trying 
to deter.55 This further leads to the major constitutional flaws with existing 
cyberbullying laws: the legislatures’ overly ambitious attempt to “eliminate” 
cyberbullying and thereby integrating its definition as a social problem with 
the legal definition of cyberbullying as a crime.56 While broad social models of 
the definition of cyberbullying may be useful in devising policy responses to 
the issue, lawmakers need to create more narrow, “perhaps less politically 
satisfying” definitions of cyberbullying.57 
B. Lack of a Federal Cyberbullying Law: United States v. Drew 
Presently, there are no federal laws that directly address cyberbullying.58 
However, in 2009, the Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act was 
introduced to the House of Representatives although it was never enacted.59 
Thirteen-year-old Megan Meier’s story was a prominent one, for it was the 
signal event that revolutionized cyberbullying into a national issue ultimately 
resulting in legal reform.60 Beginning in 2006, defendant Lori Drew and her 
co-conspirators created a fake social media account on MySpace as a sixteen-
year-old boy under the alias of “Josh Evans.”61 The defendant led Megan to 
believe that Josh had a romantic interest in her and won Megan’s trust up until 
he cruelly notified her he no longer wanted to be friends.62 He concluded by 
telling her, “The world would be a better place without [you] in it.”63 Megan 
responded, “You’re the kind of boy a girl would kill herself over.”64 It was 
 
 55. Emerging Realities, supra note 49, at 614. 
 56. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 698. 
 57. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 699. 
 58. Federal Laws, STOPBULLYING.GOV, http://www.stopbullying.gov/laws/federal/in 
dex.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). Federal case law does allow schools to discipline students 
for off-campus behavior that results in a substantial disruption of the learning environment at 
school. The states have codified that standard in state statutes. See infra note 74, at 1; see also 
infra notes 76–78 (discussing the states’ statutes). 
 59. See, e.g., Cyberbullying Prevention Act of 2008, supra note 33; see also infra, notes 103, 
105–109 (discussing why the Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act of 2008 was not 
enacted). 
 60. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 700. 
 61. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Rebecca Cathcart, Judge Throws Out Conviction in Cyberbullying Case, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/03/us/03bully.html?_r=0. 
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approximately twenty minutes after Megan left the computer screen that she 
hung herself in her bedroom.65 
The county prosecutor declined to file any criminal charges, while the 
federal prosecutor creatively interpreted law and charged the defendant with 
one count of conspiracy66 and three violations of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (the “Act”) for “intentionally access[ing] a computer used in 
interstate commerce without (and/or in excess of) authorization in order to 
obtain information for the purpose of committing the tortious acts of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress on [Megan].”67 Essentially, the 
defendant was being charged with violating MySpace’s terms of service by 
“defrauding” MySpace and misrepresenting her identity and motive.68 
Megan’s case exemplifies what happens when there is no explicit 
cyberbullying law in place, and highly aggressive prosecutors innovatively 
attempt to stuff these incidents into existing statutes that do not fit the 
circumstances.69 In many cases this misdirection of prosecutorial resources is 
not done consistently or appropriately.70 Nonetheless, a federal district judge 
overturned the jury verdict finding the defendant guilty of this misdemeanor 
violation of the Act.71 The judge reasoned that to uphold this conviction would 
“transform the [Act] into an overwhelmingly overbroad enactment that would 
convert a multitude of otherwise innocent Internet users into misdemeanant 
criminals.”72 While the defendant in this case escaped criminal liability, she 
still suffered severe social condemnation for her despicable conduct.73 
C. States’ Legislative Response Through School Based Remedies and the 
Drawbacks 
While no federal cyberbullying law has successfully been enacted, in 
recent years every state has passed some type of legislation to address the issue 
of bullying in general.74 Among these statutes, the ones that directly address 
cyberbullying can be divided into two main categories: states that advise public 
schools to implement anti-bullying policies and procedures and those that 
 
 65. The Top Six Unforgettable Cyberbullying Cases Ever, NOBULLYING.COM, (Dec. 22, 
2015), http://nobullying.com/six-unforgettable-cyber-bullying-cases/. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452–453. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Patchin, supra note 27. 
 70. Patchin, supra note 27. 
 71. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452. 
 72. Id. at 466. 
 73. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 702. 
 74. See Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws, CYBERBULLYING 
RESEARCH CENTER, http://cyberbullying.org/Bullying-and-Cyberbullying-Laws.pdf. 
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criminalize cyberbullying specifically both on and off campus.75 In total, there 
are twenty-three states that have adopted statutes that include cyberbullying 
and eighteen of which impose criminal sanctions.76 However, these approaches 
fail to effectively address severe cases of cyberbullying, including instances 
where suicide results.77 The most common types of statutes are those that 
merely regulate school policies and fail to directly address cyberbullying by 
perpetrators outside of the school system, private school cyberbullies, or 
incidents that occur off of school campuses78 where a majority of online 
communication between teens occurs.79 With so many students carrying cell 
phones, schools have begun to enact rules banning cell phone use at school.80 
This suggests that the majority of the cyberbullying taking place among teens 
is not confined to school premises. 
Maine’s statute resembles most states when it comes to regulating school 
board policies.81 It prohibits both bullying and cyberbullying on campus and 
further requires school boards to create policies with specific procedures in 
place for anonymously reporting bullies, referring identified bullies to 
counseling, and carving out disciplinary action for violators.82 In 2010, 
Massachusetts, where Carter and Conrad resided, was one of the states that 
passed an anti-bullying law that included the prohibition of cyberbullying.83 It 
addresses those behaviors that “materially and substantially disrupt the 
education process or the orderly operation of a school.”84 Ultimately, these 
school-based policy statutes fail to reach perpetrators like Carter, who did not 
go to the same school as Conrad, and they do not encompass adults or parents 
of students like the defendant that targeted Megan Meier. Additionally, while 
some states’ school policy statutes apply to private schools, other states do not 
extend these protections to private school students.85 States that fail to 
 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. Hawaii, Michigan, and New York all currently propose criminal sanctions. 
 77. Phillips, supra note 30, at 191. 
 78. Phillips, supra note 30, at 184. See also, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193–F:4 (2011); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666 (2010); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16–7.7 (2015) (requiring 
only public school districts and chartered public schools to implement anti-cyberbullying 
policies). 
 79. Infra notes 82–83. 
 80. Catherine Donaldson-Evans, Schools Make Rules For Cell Phone No-Nos, FOX NEWS 
(Sept. 23, 2004), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2004/09/23/schools-make-rules-for-cell-phone-
no-nos.html. 
 81. Phillips, supra note 30, at 185. 
 82. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20–A, § 6554 (2015). 
 83. See, e.g., Anti-Bullying and Harassment Act of 2011, H.R. 975, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2011). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Phillips, supra note 30, at 185; see also Donaldson-Evans, supra note 80, and 
accompanying text. 
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recognize cyberbullying in their anti-bullying statutes and states that merely 
regulate at the school level are failing to account for the outlying cases such as 
Conrad and Megan Meier’s. 
D. Additional Criminal Cyberbullying Statutes 
As a companion, some states have recently begun to enact their own 
aggressive cyberbullying statutes that impose criminal sanctions on violators in 
response to some of these high-publicity cases resulting in suicides.86 These 
statutes are broad and generally apply to anyone who harasses a minor online 
as opposed to only applying to public school students.87 North Carolina is a 
prime example of what these statutes entail.88 North Carolina makes it a 
misdemeanor for anyone to engage in a number of online harassment activities, 
that includes but is not limited to, creating a fake online profile, pretending to 
be a minor online, or “us[ing] a computer system for repeated, continuing, or 
sustained electronic communications” with the intent to “intimidate” or 
“torment” a person.89 Other popular attributes in state laws include a broad 
definition of “electronic communications” and require “malicious” intent.90 
While these state laws attempt to address the major gaps in school-based 
policy statutes and at first glance seem favorable, they also create their own 
hazards and are difficult to enforce.91 Above all, cyberbullying statutes are 
 
 86. Phillips, supra note 30, at 186. Other states have utilized tort remedies, while several 
cities and counties also have ordinances against cyberbullying. Id. at 184, 187. However, not all 
states draft entirely new legislation. Some follow Missouri’s legislative path: in response to 
Megan Meier’s case in 2008, Missouri modernized its existing criminal harassment statute 
(codified at MO. REV. STAT. § 565.090 (2016)), invalidated in part by State v. Vaughn, 366 
S.W.3d 513 (Mo. 2012) (severing subsection (5) from the act as unconstitutionally overbroad). 
Many states amend their harassment or stalking laws to further encompass cyber versions of these 
offenses. Although amendments of this type only seem like minor adjustments to cover new, 
electronic means of committing acts that are already criminal, these amendments inevitably target 
“non-physical” harassment and stalking, which only consists of expressive conduct. Without 
arduous drafting in the expansion of these laws, cyber stalking and cyber harassment would be 
unlikely to withstand constitutional challenges. Seemingly, legislatures would be better off 
creating entirely new laws as opposed to amending old ones. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 
700. 
 87. Phillips, supra note 30, at 186. 
 88. Phillips, supra note 30, at 186. 
 89. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–458.1 (2016). 
 90. Phillips, supra note 30, at 186; see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3–805(a)(2) 
(2016)(broadly defining electronic communications as the transmission of information, data, or 
communication by the use of a computer or any other electronic means that is sent to a person and 
that is received by the person); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.7(A) (with the malicious and 
willful intent to coerce, abuse, torment, or intimidate a person under the age of eighteen). 
 91. Phillips, supra note 30, at 186–88. Many adolescents do not feel comfortable reporting 
these incidents, and they often go undetected until it is too late. There are also issues such as law 
enforcement’s lack of expertise in the realm of cyberspace and relatively limited resources and 
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difficult to draft without running afoul of the First Amendment.92 Many 
cyberbullying laws criminalize broad sweeps of online communication, and as 
a result, the statutory language would unlikely withstand constitutional 
vagueness and overbreadth challenges.93 By failing to define terms such as 
“intimidate” or “harass,” statutes would likely be rendered impermissibly 
vague and infringe on our constitutional right to freedom of speech.94 For 
example, if a victim is extremely reserved or has been isolated from society, 
merely using swear words in an online forum could rise to the level of 
intimidation or harassment.95 Moreover, by criminalizing these laundry lists of 
online behaviors, the laws encompass an extremely wide range of online 
activities, some of which fall outside of an appropriately tailored definition of 
cyberbullying.96 For example, there is the possibility that the statute would 
criminalize adding a juvenile’s name to a spam list.97 In People v. Marquan 
M., New York’s Court of Appeals was the first court to strike down a county’s 
cyberbullying statute on constitutional grounds because the statutory language 
as written was not “fairly susceptible to an interpretation that satisfies 
applicable First Amendment requirements.”98 If the reasoning of the Court in 
Marquan M. was applied to various other criminal cyberbullying statutes, 
several would likely be held unconstitutional because they criminalize online 
speech too generally.99 
Had the Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act passed into federal 
law, it would have “amend[ed] the federal criminal code to impose criminal 
penalties on anyone who transmits in interstate or foreign commerce a 
communication intended to coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial 
emotional distress to another person, using electronic means to support severe, 
repeated, and hostile behavior.”100 As drafted, Megan’s Act received little 
enthusiasm from the House subcommittee who thought the measure was an 
unconstitutional breach of free speech.101 The committee’s chairman warned 
 
knowledge of cybercrimes. Further, by prohibiting online activities based on the author’s intent 
and adding this mens rea requirement, i.e. that the perpetrator acted intentionally, purposefully, or 
willfully, it is challenging to reach convictions because mental states are often difficult to prove 
in all areas of criminal law. Id. 
 92. Phillips, supra note 30, at 188. 
 93. Phillips, supra note 30, at 180. 
 94. Phillips, supra note 30, at 201. 
 95. Phillips, supra note 30, at 201. 
 96. Phillips, supra note 30, at 186. 
 97. Phillips, supra note 30, at 202. 
 98. Phillips, supra note 30, at 181 (citing People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480 (N.Y. 
2014). 
 99. Phillips, supra note 30, at 181; see generally Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d at 480. 
 100. See, e.g., Cyberbullying Prevention Act of 2008, supra note 33. 
 101. David Kravets, Cyberbullying Bill Gets Chilly Reception, WIRED (Sept. 30, 2009, 6:37 
PM), http://www.wired.com/2009/09/cyberbullyingbill/. 
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that “[w]e need to be extremely careful before heading down this path.”102 The 
law could unintentionally punish political or other forms of speech; for 
example, a blogger coercing a politician into voting a particular way.103 By 
repeatedly using a hostile tone, the author could be using electronic means to 
transmit a communication into interstate commerce with the intent to coerce, 
therefore violating the law.104 Megan’s Act further proposed up to two years of 
imprisonment for violators.105 The committee therefore was concerned that the 
legislation was “over-criminaliz[ing].”106 Promulgating new and zealous 
cyberbullying laws can also be considered over-criminalizing because the 
legislature is essentially creating new crimes that overlap with existing ones.107 
These statutes often coincide with assault, battery, eavesdropping, wiretapping, 
and threat-making, among other crimes.108 As a result, cyberbullies, most of 
which are juveniles, run the risk of being disproportionately punished for their 
wrongdoing when prosecutors charge them with multiple offenses or 
unwarranted charges with severe sentences.109 Ultimately, the states’ 
haphazard cyberbullying laws fail to account for perpetrators like Carter and 
offer no assistance in the prosecution of Conrad’s case. 
E. How to Effectively Combat Severe Incidents of Cyberbullying 
Legislators are struggling to find a comprehensive and effective solution to 
protect cyberbullying victims without drafting statutes that would likely be 
subject to significant vagueness and overbreadth challenges under the First 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Larry Magid, Stop Cyberbullying with Education, Not New Law, CNET (July 19, 2009, 
12:20 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/stop-cyberbullying-with-education-not-new-law/. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See, e.g., Cyberbullying Prevention Act of 2008, supra note 33 at § 3(a)(a). 
 106. Kravets, supra note 101. 
 107. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 697–698. Douglas Husak, a professor of philosophy, 
has studied the principle of over-criminalization in depth. He has attempted to formulate a theory 
for identifying “criminal laws that are justified” and “those that are not.” He identified the 
creation of “overlapping crimes” as one example of over-criminalization. He further explains that 
overlapping crimes often come about when tragedies, such as youth suicides, attract national 
media attention, and, as a result, officials publicly pledge to take action to prevent similar cases in 
the future. Oftentimes, this consists of the enactment of a seemingly new offense. Husak explains 
that new statutes are necessary if they truly prohibit harmful and culpable conduct that was not 
already criminalized. Such cases, however, are rare. Far more typically, the original conduct was 
already prohibited by law, and the new offense actually describes that criminal behavior in greater 
specificity, while imposing a more severe sentence. As is the issue in this case, the new law 
frequently involves the use of a technological innovation such as a cell phone or computer. Id. 
(citing generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
(2008). 
 108. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 698. 
 109. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 698. 
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Amendment or over-criminalizing cyberbullies.110 As a result of the major 
gaps in current laws, the atypical cases that result in suicide have no effective 
criminal procedure in place. The inconsistencies among the states leave many 
unanswered questions.111 The behaviors that constitute cyberbullying evolve 
drastically from state to state and from school campuses to students’ homes.112 
The penalties for cyberbullying outside of school intervention range from civil 
penalties to misdemeanors and felonies with prison sentences.113 It is also 
unclear if cyberbullying should be criminal in the first place, and if so, should 
warrant a manslaughter charge with a long prison sentence like Carter, a 
misdemeanor as in Megan Meier’s case, or some lesser offense. After all, most 
cyberbullying violators are juveniles. To punish juveniles so harshly in an area 
of the law that is so arbitrary and underdeveloped seems unjust. 
Lawmakers’ reflexive criminalization of cyberbullying due to political and 
emotional pressure is understandable; however, simultaneously criminalizing 
common childhood wrongdoing, especially when committed through speech, 
can lead to unfavorable consequences.114 Legislatures have been too ambitious 
in their attempt to “eliminate” cyberbullying and have tried to encompass far 
too much conduct in one statute, thereby potentially violating the First 
Amendment.115 As of now, statutes are drafted to deter incidents ranging from 
adults in an online forum telling children to go kill themselves to name-calling 
among teenagers through text messages. I suggest that lawmakers clearly 
define four different categories of cyberbullying, including: (1) minor conduct 
that schools are better equipped to tackle through administrative responses; (2) 
severe conduct that rises to the level of criminal such as threats and stalking; 
(3) tortious conduct such as invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, libel, and defamation; and116 (4) merely ill-mannered 
conduct that is better left stigmatized by public shaming and shunning.117 Not 
 
 110. Emerging Realities, supra note 49, at 617. 
 111. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 74. 
 112. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 74. 
 113. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 74. 
 114. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 697. 
 115. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 712. 
 116. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 718. 
 117. See, e.g., Daniel Solove, More facts about the Megan Meier Case, CONCURRING 
OPINIONS (Dec. 7, 2007), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/12/more_facts_a 
bou.html. After Megan Meier’s trial, Drew (the defendant) received death threats and repulsive 
insults. On the Internet, she was portrayed as a monster who should go to prison, lose custody of 
her children, or worse. Her name and address were posted online, and an Internet site with 
satellite images of her home said she should “rot in hell.” Her home-based business was run into 
the ground because she lost all of her clients. Someone obtained Drew’s cell phone password to 
replace her voicemail recording with a disturbing message. Her neighbors had reported that she 
had not been seen outside for a lengthy amount of time, and the sheriff in her town reported that 
patrols had drastically increased around the Drew residence for fear of her safety. 
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all of these issues can be resolved through statutory law nor should they be.118 
Criminal statutes should focus on only criminalizing particularly troublesome 
forms of narrowly defined online activities, such as threats, stalking, fighting 
words, repetitive speech, and adult-to-student speech since children are more 
emotionally vulnerable and have a higher necessity for these types of 
protections.119 While narrow legislation of this type of specificity is not as 
politically popular, it is far more likely to uphold to First Amendment 
scrutiny.120 By distinguishing between different degrees of cyberbullying and 
creating separate solutions for what only seems like one major social issue, 
prosecutors are capable of a more tightly drawn and effective response to these 
severe incidents without over-criminalizing any of these types of behaviors. 
Most significantly, states are failing to account for the mental illnesses that 
the overwhelming majority of suicidal cyberbullying victims suffer from.121 
Since it is unlikely that being a victim of cyberbullying by itself will lead to 
suicide, laws should address that at some point the cyberbully is no longer the 
cause of the victim’s decision to end their own life. Ideally, the states need to 
find common ground between psychological research and legal research in 
order to better grasp the role that mental illness plays in suicides before 
concluding that cyberbullies’ words were the sole cause of the suicides. 
Navigating these subtle and often wavering lines of criminal culpability lends 
itself to strong evidence that the appropriate remedy for these types of cases 
may be found in the civil courts. 
Even if the Massachusetts legislature was to amend their current 
cyberbullying statutes as proposed, Carter’s words would still unlikely rise to 
the level of criminal. On its face, Carter pressuring Conrad to commit suicide 
through text messages is atrocious; however, Carter and Conrad’s relationship 
did not resemble that of a typical cyberbully and their victim.122 When viewed 
alone Carter’s text messages are troublesome, but there are also excerpts where 
they displayed their love to one another and where Carter urged Conrad to go 
to the psychiatric hospital where she was already receiving treatment for her 
own condition.123 According to Carter’s defense attorney, “It should be further 
noted the district attorney did not release all of the various text messages which 
showed for months prior to Conrad Roy’s suicide Miss Carter continuously 
requested he seek help.”124 Carter was his confidant and romantic interest.125 
 
 118. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 725. 
 119. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 725. 
 120. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 725. 
 121. Risk of Suicide, supra note 38. 
 122. See generally Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1. 
 123. See generally Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1. 
 124. Lindsay McCane, Michelle Carter: Conrad Roy III’s Girlfriend Charged with 
Involuntary Manslaughter for his Suicide, Inquisitr (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.inquisitr.com/240 
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Conrad had told her that she was one of the reasons he had not yet committed 
suicide: “Without you and my family I’d be long gone.”126 Moreover, 
Conrad’s history of depression and prior suicide attempt raise the inference 
that Conrad would have taken his life without the assistance of Carter’s text 
messages. As the legislatures struggle to draft cyberbullying laws that can 
withstand constitutional scrutiny, it becomes more clear that the First 
Amendment does not allow criminal law to be used to punish every social 
contravention when committed through speech alone. 
II.  ASSISTED SUICIDE 
A. Defining Assisted Suicide and the Recent Statutory Modifications 
Carter’s conduct more closely resembles what some states’ assisted suicide 
laws ban. Allegedly, the lack of a criminal prohibition against assisted suicide 
in Massachusetts makes the case against Carter “an uphill battle for the 
prosecution.”127 However, even if Massachusetts did outlaw assisted suicide, 
in many states her conduct would still remain outside the scope of the 
statute.128 Assisted suicide is defined as “[the] intentional act of providing a 
person with the medical means or the medical knowledge to commit suicide,” 
which is not to be confused with physician-assisted suicide which occurs 
“when a doctor provides the means.”129 Carter was the one who devised the 
plan to poison Conrad through the use of a combustion engine that would 
generate carbon monoxide.130 Her efforts included advice on the plan’s 
technical aspects: “If you emit 3200 ppm of [carbon monoxide] for five or ten 
minutes you will die within a half hour . . . . You can also just take a hose and 
run that from the exhaust pipe to the rear window in your car and seal it with 
duct tape and shirts, so it can’t escape.”131 “[T]ake some Benadryls before just 
in case and then you’ll breath it in and pass out and die very quickly and 




 125. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 26. 
 126. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 26. 
 127. Slifer, supra note 24. 
 128. See State-by-State Guide to Physician-Assisted Suicide, PROCON.ORG (Oct. 5, 2015), 
http://euthanasia.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000132 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) 
[hereinafter “State-by-State Guide”]. 
 129. Katie Franklin, Comment, Physician-Assisted Death, Dementia, and Euthanasia: Using 
an Advances Directive to Facilitate the Desires of Those with Impending Memory Loss, 51 IDAHO 
L. REV. 547, 552 (2015). 
 130. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 6. 
 131. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 6. 
 132. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 8. 
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her research, Carter further proposed the idea of purchasing a carbon monoxide 
tank, a regulator, and a feeding tube to go directly into Conrad’s lungs.133 It 
was her idea for Conrad to drive his truck to a parking lot in the daytime, an 
area where no one would interfere with the plan or report him, and where his 
suicide would be “less suspicious.”134 “Just park your car and sit there and it 
will take, like, 20 minutes. It’s not a big deal.”135 Carter suggested specific 
alternative suicide methods as well, such as a suffocating himself with a bag or 
by hanging himself.136 She then advised Conrad on how to conceal the 
preparation and execution of the plan from his parents.137 
There is currently a great deal of debate surrounding the morality of 
assisting someone to commit suicide, although most of it centers around 
physician-assisted suicide.138 In 1997, the United States Supreme Court 
unanimously held that there is no Constitutional right to assisted suicide, which 
left the states free to pass their own laws prohibiting it.139 As a result, there are 
forty states to date that have passed assisted suicide laws140 although the 
degree of punishment varies drastically for perpetrators,141 similar to 
cyberbullying laws. Many states define assisted suicide as a form of homicide, 
most commonly manslaughter, but some consider it murder.142 Contrarily, 
other states punish perpetrators with professional discipline, a fine, or 
damages.143 
 
 133. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 6. 
 134. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 33. 
 135. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 10. 
 136. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 11. 
 137. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 10. 
 138. See Franklin, supra note 129, at 563. See, e.g., Massachusetts “Death with Dignity” 
Initiative, Question 2 (2012), https://ballotpedia.org/Massachusetts_%22Death_with_Dignity% 
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on the November general election ballot as an indirect initiated state statute. Id. The proposed 
measure would have allowed for terminally ill patients to be given lethal drugs, but it was 
defeated. The petition number for the initiative was 11-12. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 14401 (1997). 
In 1997, President Clinton signed the Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, 
which prohibits the use of federal funds in support of physician-assisted suicide (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 14401). Id. 
 139. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705, 727 (1997) (holding Washington’s ban on 
assisted suicide rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest). 
 140. Susan Zalkind, Is Telling Someone to Commit Suicide a Crime? VICE (Sept. 2, 2015), 
http://www.vice.com/read/is-telling-someone-to-commit-suicide-a-crime-902. 
 141. See generally Zalkind, supra note 140. 
 142. See State-by-State Guide, supra note 128. 
 143. See State-by-State Guide, supra note 128. In some states, if a suicide or an attempted 
suicide results, then the degree of punishment is worse.; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (2016); 
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ANN. § 22.08 (2015); PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505 (2016). 
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A study found that only one-sixth of all reported assisted suicide cases are 
prosecuted.144 Since law enforcement and prosecutors appear reluctant to bring 
forth charges in these cases, it seems fair to conclude that, as drafted, assisted 
suicide laws may be unworkable.145 This also lends itself to evidence that this 
unwillingness to seek criminal sanctions is proof of law enforcement’s 
sympathetic attitude towards violators and failure to see culpability.146 If the 
vast majority of assisted suicide cases are not investigated or prosecuted, then 
statutory enforcement is not uniform which can result in serious injustice when 
these laws are enforced.147 
Public policy surrounding assisted suicide also seems to be changing in 
recent years.148 While for a long time these laws have been long-standing 
expressions of the states’ commitment to the preservation of human life, the 
majority of Americans now believe that a person has a moral right to end their 
own life if they are suffering.149 Accordingly, there are five states that 
explicitly allow for physicians to prescribe life-ending medication to patients 
in this instance.150 
Of the states that make assisting suicide criminal, some prohibit the 
broadly defined acts of “aiding” or “assisting” another person to commit 
 
 144. Catherine D. Shaffer, Note, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
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suicide statutes and prosecutions even though suicide is not a crime in any state). 
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With Dignity Act (ODWDA) exempting civil or criminal liability to state-licensed physicians 
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a terminally ill patient, codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2006)); Patient Choice at End of 
Life Act, 2013 Bill Text VT S.B. 77 (2013) (allowing Vermont residents with terminal diseases 
the option to be described a lethal dose of drugs); Medicare End-of-Life Care Planning Act of 
2007, 110 S. 466 (2007); Baxter v. State, No. ADV-2007-787, 2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 482, at 
*36 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 2008) (holding that a competent, terminally ill patient has a right to 
die with dignity without violating Montana’s Constitution); Washington Death with Dignity Act, 
REV. CODE WASH. (ARCW) § 70.245.901. All of these states require specific qualifications such 
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expected within six months, and the patient must orally request to the physician that they wish to 
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Id. Montana is the only of the five states that has no legal protocol in place when it comes to the 
age requirement, number of months until death is expected, or the number of requests to the 
physician. Baxter, 2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 482, at *36. 
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suicide.151 However, several states have amended their statutes to further 
require intent and causation.152 Most importantly, many states have moved 
away from broad prohibitions on “encouraging” or “advising” someone to 
commit suicide and now explicitly require some physical act beyond pure 
speech.153 For example, Georgia defines assist as “the act of physically helping 
or physically providing the means” to commit suicide.154 In Arizona, it is 
manslaughter to “intentionally provide the physical means that another person 
uses to commit suicide, with the knowledge that the person intends to commit 
suicide.”155 Evidence of the states’ evolving definitions of what constitutes 
assistance in carrying out assisted suicide and the further requirements of 
intent, causation, and some physical act beyond pure speech, implies that these 
broad assisted suicide laws that were encompassing words alone were 
criminalizing acts not intended to be criminalized. Carving out the stringent 
requirement of a physical act in order to convict someone further implies the 
discomfort of prosecuting defendants based entirely on what they said. This 
once again leads to the constitutional issues of criminalizing words alone. 
 
 151. Katherine Ann Wingfield & Carl S. Hacker, Physician-Assisted Suicide: An Assessment 
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B. Constitutional Freedom of Speech Protections Revisited: State v. 
Melchert-Dinkel 
One of Carter’s affirmative defenses is that her words are protected by the 
First Amendment and Article XVI’s free speech safeguards.156 Even though 
Massachusetts, Carter and Conrad’s home state, lacks an assisted suicide law 
all together, the convicted defendant’s conduct in State v. Melchert-Dinkel 
closely resembles Carter’s actions. This case is also a prime example of states’ 
assisted suicide statutes evolving in recent years due to the protections of the 
First Amendment.157 In 2012, Melchert-Dinkel was convicted under 
Minnesota’s assisted suicide statute.158 There, the defendant posed online as a 
depressed and suicidal female nurse under various aliases.159 He responded to 
posts on suicide websites presenting himself as a caring and compassionate 
friend who understood his victims’ plight and wanted to help.160 Melchert-
Dinkel described step-by-step how to commit suicide by tying a rope to a 
doorknob and slinging the rope over the top of the door, similar to how Carter 
provided step-by-step instructions to Conrad on how to poison himself in his 
truck.161 One of Melchert-Dinkel’s victims suffered from mental health issues 
and was debating on whether or not to commit suicide.162 After four days of 
ongoing electronic communications with Melchert-Dinkel who persistently 
pressured the victim to take his own life, the victim hanged himself utilizing 
Melchert-Dinkel’s proposed suicide method.163 Like Melchert-Dinkel, Carter 
also knew Conrad suffered from depression, yet encouraged Conrad to commit 
suicide through text messages and promoted her well-researched suicide 
method.164 
Minnesota’s assisted suicide statute under which Melchert-Dinkel was 
prosecuted made it illegal to “intentionally advise, encourage, or assist in 
taking the other’s own life.”165 Later in 2014, Melchert-Dinkel was tried again 
in the Minnesota Supreme Court which reversed the decision and convicted 
him only of “assisting” a suicide, thereby striking the words “encouraging” and 
“advising” from the statute.166 The court found that the part of the law that 
banned someone from “encouraging” or “advising” suicide was 
unconstitutional, but upheld the part of the law that makes it a crime to “assist” 
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in someone’s suicide despite the fact these words appear interchangeable.167 
On remand, the court held that to “assist” someone requires “a level of 
involvement in the suicide beyond merely expressing a moral viewpoint or 
providing general comfort and support.”168 In applying the majority’s 
reasoning to Conrad’s case, Carter would be convicted under the Minnesota 
statute if the prosecution could prove that her text messages rose to “a level of 
involvement in the suicide beyond merely expressing a moral viewpoint or 
providing general comfort and support” and that there was a “direct, causal 
connection” between Carter’s words and Conrad’s actions to commit suicide. 
Given Conrad’s state of mental health, the prosecution would have a difficult 
task proving that Conrad would not have committed suicide without Carter’s 
text messages. 
In Justice Page’s dissent he agreed with the majority that barring speech 
that “advises” or “encourages” suicide is unconstitutional; however, he 
disagreed with the court’s remand to determine whether Melchert-Dinkel’s 
speech “assisted” the victims in taking their own lives.169 He contended that 
according to the definition of “assist” in the dictionary there was insufficient 
evidence to prove that Melchert-Dinkel assisted in the suicides due to lack of a 
physical act.170 Justice Page pointed out that the majority’s decision to avoid 
this dictionary definition of assist was “telling” since it seemed to require a 
physical act.171 Additionally, Minnesota’s assisted suicide statute is analogous 
to its aiding and abetting statute which requires a physical act beyond mere 
words.172 Justice Page reasoned that without some action “more concrete than 
speech,” the publication of a book outlining suicide methods could be a 
violation of the First Amendment.173 Even by further requiring a direct, causal 
link between the speech and suicide, Justice Page’s book example also 
suggests a direct, causal link because it targets an entire population of mentally 
unstable and potentially suicidal people.174 The assessment of whether a direct, 
causal link exists between the victim and the person assisting suicide is 
arguably arbitrary. Even more so, Conrad’s suicidal predisposition would 
likely sever the causal chain. 
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It is important to note that suicide itself is not considered a crime in the 
United States, nor is attempted suicide or the discussion of suicide; rather, it is 
“considered an expression of mental illness.”175 Since one of the categories of 
speech that is not afforded First Amendment protections is speech generated in 
connection with illegal activities, in the event that suicide was an illegal act, 
Carter could be found guilty of “inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action.”176 However, since suicide is not unlawful conduct, this First 
Amendment exception does not apply to Conrad’s case. Counterintuitively, 
assisted suicide laws are examples of legislatures criminalizing people for 
assisting others to carry out legal acts.177 Even a surviving member of a suicide 
pact may be charged as an aider or abetter of suicide.178 Despite the relatively 
low number of cases in the United States where a party to a suicide pact has 
been charged with assisted suicide, it is poor public policy to criminalize those 
contemplating suicide that instead choose to live.179 Overall, there is a certain 
perverseness about legislatures punishing one who aids an act that is not itself 
a crime.180 
C. The Necessity for More Stringent Assisted Suicide Statutes 
The Minnesota Supreme Court striking the verbs “encourage” and “advise” 
from their assisted suicide statute, in addition to the many states that recently 
added a requirement of some physical act beyond pure speech, intent, and 
causation in their assisted suicide laws, all lend themselves to the conclusion 
that convicting someone based purely on their words is problematic. Whether 
Carter was being tried in a state with a stringent assisted suicide law or in a 
state where speech alone constitutes assistance, all of these statutes come with 
serious public policy concerns. Further magnifying the major inconsistencies 
among the states, there are five states that explicitly legalize assisted suicide 
and five others that are silent on the issue. If states are insistent upon keeping 
their laws that ban assisted suicide, I suggest that they strike behaviors such as 
“encourage” or “advise” from their laws just as Minnesota did subsequent to 
Melchert-Dinkel. By criminalizing words of encouragement and advice, 
legislatures are prohibiting broad sweeps of communication and 
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simultaneously breaching the First Amendment. These states should further 
strike broad acts such as “aid” and “assist” from their statutes because these 
laws would likely be deemed constitutionally vague. 
I next suggest the states adopt more stringent assisted suicide laws that 
further require proof of intent, causation, and a physical act. Evidence of some 
states already adding these elements and moving away from prohibitions on 
“encouraging” or “advising” someone to commit suicide, suggests that laws 
where speech alone constitutes assistance are criminalizing words not intended 
to be criminalized. With such a small percentage of reported assisted suicide 
cases being prosecuted, by adopting these proposed amendments, the statutes 
would be more specific and would offer law enforcement and prosecutors clear 
guidance in order to successfully bring forth these charges. These proposed 
statutes are superior to current state statutes because a streamlined definition of 
assistance will remove the obscure assessment of what constitutes assistance in 
order to reach a conviction. By no means should cyber-based encouragement 
alone fall within the scope of any states’ assisted suicide laws because 
anything broader would likely not withstand First Amendment challenges. 
Conrad’s case once again brings attention to the disharmony of the states’ 
promulgation of statutes surrounding convictions based on pure speech. 
Nevertheless, if Massachusetts were to make these proposed amendments, 
Carter’s text messages would be an insufficient act to constitute assistance. 
The First Amendment once again suggests that just because conduct is 
reprehensible, does not mean it is criminal. 
III.  INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER 
A. The Seeming Need for a Physical Act in Massachusetts: Persampieri v. 
Commonwealth 
The majority of states issue statutes solely addressing assisted suicide and 
recognize it as a unique offense; however, there are eight states that include 
assisted suicide in their manslaughter or homicide statutes.181 While Carter and 
Conrad’s home state of Massachusetts is one of the states with no explicit 
statute that prohibits assisted suicide, Massachusetts’ manslaughter statute has 
a case in the notes following the statute from the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts that is related to assisted suicide.182 The note is about a case, 
Persampieri v. Commonwealth, that reads “husband aiding wife to commit 
suicide could be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter.”183 Although the 
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facts in Persampieri are comparable to Conrad’s case, Carter’s actions can be 
distinguished due to her lack of physical assistance in the suicide. 
In Persampieri, the defendant informed his wife that he was going to file 
for divorce after they returned home from a social gathering.184 The wife had 
been drinking and was in a fragile emotional state when she threatened to 
commit suicide.185 The defendant reminded her that she had attempted suicide 
on two prior occasions and said she was “chicken . . . and wouldn’t do it.”186 
He then told her to go and get the .22 caliber rifle in the kitchen.187 When the 
wife unsuccessfully tried to load the gun, the defendant loaded it for her and 
handed the gun back to his wife.188 “She put . . . [it] between her legs with the 
butt . . . on the floor and the muzzle barrel against her forehead.”189 His wife 
tried to reach the trigger, but was unable to.190 At the advice of her husband, 
she removed her shoe so she could reach the trigger, and the gun discharged.191 
The wife died the following day, and the defendant was convicted of 
involuntary manslaughter for the reckless disregard of his wife’s safety and the 
possible consequences of his conduct.192 Similar to the victim in Persampieri, 
Conrad had mental health issues and previously attempted to take his own life; 
still Carter continued to goad him with his suicidal thoughts. Arguably, 
Persampieri is precedent that assisted suicide is prohibited in Massachusetts, at 
least under common law.193 Nonetheless, Carter’s case can be distinguished 
from Persampieri who handed his wife a loaded gun because there was no 
physical exchange between Carter and Conrad. Likewise, Carter was not in the 
same proximity as Conrad, but was in a location far away on a cell phone when 
he committed suicide.194 
B. The Prosecution’s Prima Facie Claim: Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
v. Michelle Carter 
Carter was indicted on involuntary manslaughter charges, “an unlawful 
homicide unintentionally caused by an act which constitutes such disregard of 
probable harmful consequences to another as to amount to wanton or reckless 
conduct.”195 In Massachusetts, there is no statutory definition of manslaughter; 
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its elements are derived from common law.196 In order to prove involuntary 
manslaughter: (1) the defendant’s conduct must have been intentional; (2) the 
conduct must have been wanton and reckless; and (3) the conduct must have 
been the cause of the victim’s death.197 
In order to prove that Carter acted with the requisite intent, the first 
element of the crime, the prosecution heavily relies on Carter telling Conrad to 
get back in the truck when he feared that the plan was working.198 On the day 
of the suicide, Carter’s final text message to Conrad read, “You can do this.”199 
Three minutes later Conrad called Carter, and they talked on the phone for 
ninety minutes.200 At some point during that call, Conrad got out of the car 
“because [the carbon monoxide poisoning] was working and he got scared.”201 
Carter “told him to get back in.”202 Second, Carter’s forceful assistance and 
counsel over the course of the week prior to Conrad’s suicide, and not just 
during the incident, is further evidence she intended for Conrad to take his own 
life.203 Finally, the prosecution looks to Carter’s ploys to get attention after 
Conrad’s death to prove her intent.204 After the suicide, Carter published 
Facebook and Twitter posts about Conrad: “Even though I could not save my 
boyfriend’s life, I want to put myself out here to try to save as many other lives 
as possible.”205 Carter created a Facebook event for a fundraiser that she 
organized in Conrad’s memory.206 She held the fundraiser in her hometown, a 
considerable distance from Conrad’s hometown.207 When Conrad’s friend, 
Tom, proposed holding the tournament closer to Conrad’s friends and family, 
Carter became upset.208 Carter told Tom, “[T]his was my idea. I created it to be 
here.”209 When Tom shared the Facebook event through his Facebook account, 
Carter asked him, “You’re not taking credit for my idea though; right? 
LOL.”210 At the tournament, Tom noticed that Carter was acting strange and 
seeking attention.211 Conrad’s sisters said they felt uncomfortable because they 
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did not know anyone there.212 While Carter’s conduct subsequent to the 
suicide does not portray her in a positive light, she arguably resembles a 
typical teenage girl. By alleging that these actions constitute intent is a difficult 
argument for the prosecution to make in proving their heavy burden. 
To prove the second element, the prosecutors rely on the facts of 
Persampieri as support that her conduct was “wanton or reckless,” i.e. 
“intentional conduct . . . involving a high degree of likelihood that substantial 
harm will result to another.”213 Recall that the defendant in Persampieri 
handed his emotionally unstable wife a loaded gun that discharged when she 
removed her shoe at the advice of her husband, and therefore the defendant 
was convicted of involuntary manslaughter.214 The prosecution reasons that, 
like the defendant in Persampieri, Carter knew Conrad had previously 
attempted to commit suicide and that he was planning to do it again, yet 
continued to provoke Conrad with texts like “[y]ou always say you’re gonna 
do it, but never do.”215 Carter was in a position of trust as Conrad’s confidant 
and had specific knowledge that her relationship with him was one of the 
reasons he had not already committed suicide, further demonstrating her 
reckless behavior.216 Carter offered Conrad comfort by convincing him that his 
family and friends would understand and that his parents would not be afflicted 
with emotional distress, but would “get over it and move on.”217 The 
prosecution also points to Carter’s failure to alleviate the risk created by her 
actions as wanton or reckless behavior.218 They contend that if an individual’s 
actions create a life-threatening condition, there is a duty to take reasonable 
steps to alleviate the risk created.219 Carter allegedly had days to report 
Conrad’s purchase of a combustion engine and hours to warn authorities the 
day of the incident.220 Nevertheless, not only can Carter’s actions be 
distinguished from Persampieri because she did not affirmatively assist in the 
suicide by handing Conrad a loaded gun, but under Commonwealth v. Pugh, 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that “proof of recklessness 
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requires more than a mistake of judgment or even gross negligence.”221 In that 
case, the Court held that there was insufficient evidence to convict the 
defendant on a theory of wanton or reckless behavior when the defendant’s 
failure to call for assistance, i.e. omission to act, was the proximate cause of 
the death that resulted.222 While Carter may have been grossly negligent, her 
failure to alleviate the risk likely does not constitute wanton or reckless 
behavior. 
In support of the third element of causation, the prosecution again relies on 
the reasoning in Persampieri: “[A] defendant can cause a victim’s death by 
influencing and enabling him to take his own life.”223 The prosecution focuses 
on Carter telling Conrad “to get back in” when he exited the truck while in a 
suicidal state and suffering from the effects of carbon monoxide poisoning.224 
As in many cases of assisted suicide, causation proves to be a significant 
hurdle for the prosecution.225 For involuntary manslaughter, as with all 
homicides, the defendant’s acts must be the proximate cause of the victim’s 
death, i.e. but for the defendant’s actions, the death would not have ensued. In 
1816, Commonwealth v. Bowen was the first assisted suicide case that took 
place in the United States and coincidentally it was in Massachusetts.226 Other 
courts have presented similar doctrines of causation as laid out in Bowen.227 
There, the defendant was indicted in a lower court feloniously for counseling, 
persuading, and procuring a fellow prisoner, Jewett, to hang himself the day 
before Jewett was scheduled to be executed.228 The Commonwealth appealed, 
maintaining that advising someone to murder themselves was in itself 
murder.229 The relevant inquiry was whether the prisoner was instrumental in 
the suicide of Jewett, by advice or otherwise.230 The jury instructions 
concentrated on the question of causation – whether or not the defendant’s 
advice actually had any influence on Jewett and thereby brought about the 
effect intended.231 The jury found the prisoner not guilty; probably from a 
doubt whether the advice given by him was, in any measure, the procuring 
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cause of Jewett’s death.232 Under Bowen, Carter’s advice likely was not the 
“procuring cause” of Conrad’s suicide. 
An act is a cause of a victim’s death if the act, in a natural and continuous 
sequence, results in death, and without the act, death would not have 
occurred.233 Carter’s defense attorney argues that there is no evidence that 
Carter caused Conrad’s death because he obtained and ran the combustion 
engine himself, while she was in a distant location on a cell phone.234 On the 
same basis, Conrad’s decision to commit suicide constituted an intervening 
event which would insulate Carter from criminal liability.235 The defense 
contends that there is no evidence that Carter “provided the means” or “set into 
action” the events which led to the suicide.236 Once again Conrad’s mental 
health issues and previous attempt at suicide imply that he likely had a 
predisposition to take his own life despite Carter’s supportive words.237 Conrad 
also left a suicide note, lending itself to the conclusion that Conrad thought his 
plan out and left his house that morning with the intent to take his own life.238 
While a grand jury decided there was sufficient evidence to indict Carter with 
probable cause of each element of involuntary manslaughter, the prosecution 
has major hurdles to overcome in order to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Carter committed manslaughter. 
IV.  THE PROPOSAL: TEXT MESSAGES ARE AN INSUFFICIENT ACTUS REUS 
After analyzing Carter’s actions under various cyberbullying, assisted 
suicide, and involuntary manslaughter laws, it would be difficult to convict her 
of any crime in many states. While few would argue that Carter’s actions were 
reprehensible, this does not mean they are criminal. Coincidentally, each 
analysis suffered from the same issues: the seeming need for a physical act 
beyond pure speech, the causal chain between Carter’s text messages and 
Conrad’s death being severed by his suicidal predisposition, and the 
protections afforded from freedom of speech under the First Amendment. 
Carter’s case will likely center around whether words in and of themselves can 
lead to criminal culpability and whether certain electronic communications, 
such as text messages, are protected under the First Amendment.239 
Unfortunately for our litigious society, just because something is repugnant 
does not automatically transform it into a criminal act. Our First Amendment 
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jurisprudence recognizes that all members of society will in many instances be 
exposed to unpleasant and even repugnant speech, ranging from rude 
comments to racial slurs.240 The only proper recourse is to develop emotional 
resiliency for the law cannot intervene in every case where someone’s 
emotions have been affected, nor would most citizens want laws to.241 Implicit 
in the right to engage in protected activities is “a corresponding right to 
associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of social, political, economic, 
educational, religious, and cultural ends.”242 
It is no coincidence that the same issues surfaced in the analysis of each 
crime. By allowing a seventeen-year-old girl’s text messages alone to suffice 
as a weapon in the manslaughter of her mentally ill teenage boyfriend, society 
would undoubtedly be lead down a slippery slope. The State would do well to 
leave punishment to tort law rather than attempt the arduous task of drafting 
cyberbullying, assisted suicide, and involuntary manslaughter statutes with 
enough precision and specificity to withstand First Amendment challenges and 
still simultaneously punish Carter’s words.243 Legislatures need to admit to 
their constituents that some social behaviors must be curtailed through 
educating, socializing, and stigmatizing perpetrators as opposed to 
criminalizing their speech.244 
CONCLUSION 
While Carter’s conduct contains components of cyberbullying, assisted 
suicide, and involuntary manslaughter, there is no statute that perfectly fits the 
circumstances. Even if the legislatures create a more tightly drawn response to 
severe cases like Conrad’s by amending existing statutes, her text messages are 
still not enough to constitute an actus reus in a criminal conviction. Society has 
a long history of being uncomfortable with convictions based on words alone, 
and the only evidence the prosecution has in Conrad’s case are Carter’s text 
messages. The combination of First Amendment protections, Conrad’s history 
of depression, and his previous suicide attempt, raise reasonable doubt that 
Conrad committed suicide solely because of Carter’s text messages. 
Furthermore, the state of Carter’s own mental health creates an impression that 
the prosecution may be attempting to criminalize mental illness. While a quick 
glimpse of Carter’s text messages leaves most people troubled, her words 
likely are not and should not be illegal, as potentially unsatisfying as that may 
be. Criminal law cannot be used to punish every social transgression, 
especially when many of those transgressions are committed through 
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speech.245 The uncomfortable truth is that Michelle Carter did something 
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